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PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A
LICENSE:1 LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO
MANDATE CHEMICAL CASTRATION FOR
REPEAT SEX OFFENDERS
LISA KEESLING*

INTRODUCTION

On May 20, 1989, Helen Harlow gave her seven-year-old son
permission to ride his bike if he promised to be back before dark.2
When her son did not return, Ms. Harlow called the police.' Later
that evening, a neighbor found her son in the woods, naked and
covered with mud.4 A man had grabbed the boy off his bike,
twisted a rope around the boy's neck, strangled him, raped him
and severed his penis.5 Miraculously, the boy survived to identify
his attacker.6 The attacker was Earl Shriner.7
Shriner's twenty-four-year history of sexual violence began at
the age of sixteen when he was accused of killing a schoolmate!
Under the law at that time, the state could not charge Shriner
with homicide because of his age. 9 Instead, he was sent to a
juvenile center. ° Once released, Shriner assaulted two teenage
1. David Van Biema & Jordan Bonfante, A Cheap Shot at Pedophilia?
California Mandates Chemical Castration for Repeat Child Molesters, TIME,
Sept. 9, 1996, at 60. In response to the enactment of California's mandatory
chemical castration law, Dr. Fred Berlin, head of the Sexual Disorder Clinic at
Johns Hopkins Hospital, stated, "There are many sex offenders for whom this
is not going to be appropriate or useful. In effect, the legislators are practicing
medicine without a license." Id.
* J.D. Candidate, June 1999.
2. Kate Shatzkin, Sex-Assault Trial Begins: Mutilated Boy Was Confused,
Says Witness, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 30, 1990, at B1; Kate Shatzkin & Anh Do,
Shriner Guilty: Jury Convicts Him in Attack on Boy, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 7,
1990, at Al.
3. Shatzkin, supra note 2, at B1.
4. Id.
5. Erik Lacitis, An Option? Chemicals Might Have Helped Earl Shriner,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 1, 1989, at Dl.
6. Gayle M.B. Hanson, Perverts Who Prey on Kids, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1995, at 8.
7. Id.
8. Shatzkin & Do, supra note 2, at Al.
9. Id.
10. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:381

girls.1 While serving his ten-year prison sentence, physicians
diagnosed Shriner as a sexual psychopath. 12 Although authorities
considered him dangerous, they released Shriner from prison at
the end of his sentence." Subsequent to Shriner's release, the
police arrested him twice for misdemeanor assaults of young
boys. 4 Shriner's career of sexual violence ended on May 26, 1990,
when Judge Thomas Sauriol sentenced him to 131 1/2 years in
prison for sexually mutilating Helen Harlow's seven-year-old son.15
The high rate of recidivism for sex offenders like Earl
Shriner17 poses a difficult problem for the criminal justice system

11. Jim Simon, System Simply Had No Way to 'Digest' Shriner, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 1, 1989, at El.
12. Id. Prior to his release, prison officials attempted to commit Shriner to
a state mental institution as a sexual psychopath. Id. Officials, however,
could not get him committed. Id. Similar attempts to admit him into a home
for the developmentally disabled also failed. Id. Although mildly retarded,
Shriner's IQ was too high to qualify him for the state's system. Id.
13. Id. During his incarceration, prison officials discovered a list on
Shriner. Lacitis, supra note 5, at D1. The list contained items needed to
injure and murder children. Id. Shriner also told a cell mate about his
fantasy of rigging a van with cages for the same purpose. Hanson, supra note
6, at 8.
14. Simon, supra note 11, at El. Prosecutors originally charged Shriner
with statutory rape and unlawful imprisonment for the second attack. Id. For
both attacks, Shriner spent a total of 133 days in jail. Id.
15. Kate Shatzkin, Shriner Gets 131 Years, SEATTLE TIMES, March 26,
1990, at Al. After six hours of deliberation, a jury found Shriner guilty of two
counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree attempted murder and
one count of first-degree assault. Shatzkin & Do, supra note 2, at Al.
16. Recidivism is the "re-offense rates of sex offenders measured by
whether they are caught." Richard Whitmire & Ellen Hale Gannett, Repeat
Offenders, DENVER POST, Dec. 21, 1995, at A25. Attorney General Janet Reno
has stated that the recidivism rate for child molesters is approximately 75%.
California Considers Chemical Castration,FLA. TODAY, Aug. 30, 1996, at A3.
In one study, 561 sex offenders had victimized over 195,000 individuals. Peter
Finn, Do Sex Offender Treatment Programs Work?, 78 JUDICATURE 250, 250
(1995). Additionally, although the total prison population from 1988 to 1990
increased by 20%, the number of individuals imprisoned for sex offenses
increased by 48%. Id. However, other experts assert that these figures are too
high and the actual rate of recidivism is between 7% and 15%. Hanson, supra
note 6, at 8.
17. Jesse Timmendequas and Richard Allen Davis are two recidivist sex
offenders whose crimes also received national attention. See Robert Teir &
Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators:Community Notification and Civil
Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405, 408 (1997)
(relating examples of sex abuse crimes and advocating the use of registration
and civil commitment laws as solutions to the problem of recidivism). Jesse
Timmendequas raped and murdered seven-year-old Megan Kanka. Tracy L.
Silva, Comment, Dial "1-900-Pervert" and Other Statutory Measures That
Provide Public Notification of Sex Offenders, 48 SMU L. REV. 1961, 1962
(1995). Later, the victim's family learned that Timmendequas had been
convicted twice for child molestation and was living with two other released
sex offenders. Id. Richard Allen Davis had been convicted eight times for
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and leaves it searching for creative sentencing alternatives. 8
Within the last decade, many states have passed a flurry of laws
in an attempt to alleviate the growing problem of sexual abuse. '9
"Three Strikes, You're Out" laws,2 ° registration laws ,1 public
notification laws" and sexual predator laws 3 are all legislative
attempts to solve the problem.2 In 1996, California took a new
approach to the problem of recidivism by enacting a law that
requires chemical castration 25 as a term of parole for certain types
sexual abuse of children before raping and murdering teenager Polly Klass.
Teir & Coy, supra at 408.
18. See Brian McCormick, Courts Opting to Treat, Rather Than Punish,
Some Abusers, 35 AM. MED. NEWS 30, 30 (1992) (outlining the new treatment
programs courts are requiring offenders to attend).
19. See Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America:
Legislating Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEW. ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 303, 311 (1997) (outlining the major
legislation enacted over the past decade to address the problem of recidivist
sex offenders).
20. First enacted in California in 1994, "Three Strikes, You're Out" laws
require the imposition of a sentence of life without possibility of parole or
probation for third time offenders. Id. at 311-12. These laws directly affect
sex offenders, since most repeat their criminal sexual behavior unless treated.
Id. at 311.
21. Registration laws require convicted sex offenders to register with the
local authorities upon release from prison. Silva, supra note 17, at 1970. The
Federal Crime Bill passed in 1994 requires all states to institute a registry or
lose federal funding. Freeman-Longo, supra note 19, at 312.
22. Public notification laws were initiated in Washington as part of the
Community Protection Act. Freeman-Longo, supra note 19, at 313. The laws
gained popularity after the death of Megan Kanka and are now more
commonly known as Megan's law. See Silva, supra note 17, at 1963 and
accompanying text. Megan's law requires law enforcement agencies to notify
the public when a registered sex offender moves into the community. Id. The
extent of notification required depends on a determination of the offender's
"risk level" or dangerousness. Freeman-Longo, supra note 19, at 313. A
federal version of Megan's law was signed by President Clinton in 1996. Id.
23. Washington was the first state to enact a sexual predator law as a
provision of the Community Protection Act of 1990. John Kip Cornwell,
Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of Sexual
Predators,53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1298-99 (1996). These laws allow
for the involuntary commitment of sexual offenders to mental institutions
after completion of their criminal sentence. Id. at 1295. The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of an identical law enacted in Kansas. Sex
PredatorLaw Triumphs in Court, NEWS TRIB., June 24, 1997, at A8. The
Court held that the law comported with the requirements of due process and
rejected arguments that it violated double jeopardy principles and ex post
facto punishment. Hendricks v. Kansas, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997).
24. Freeman-Longo, supra note 19, at 311-16.
25. The term chemical castration is misleading. Surgical castration, or
orchiectomy, is a permanent sterilization procedure in which the testicles are
removed. Id. Judge Michael T. McSpadden, Time for Public Debate on
CastratingSex Offenders, HOUSTON CHRON., June 16, 1997, at 21. Unlike
surgical castration, chemical castration is not permanent. Lacitis, supra note
5, at D1. Its effects last only as long as the treatment continues. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:381

of repeat sex offenders.26 The California statute requires paroled
sex offenders to receive weekly injections of Depo-Provera,27 a
testosterone-reducing hormone.28
This treatment rests on
controversial medical evidence that indicates hormonal agents can
successfully treat paraphiliacs 29 by reducing their proclivity
towards deviant sexual behavior. 0 While the treatment of repeat
sex offenders with this drug is not new,"1 the idea that a state
2
government can mandate it as a term of parole is unprecedented.
California's legislative attempt to force the administration of
Depo-Provera on an unwilling parolee raises a number of
constitutional issues." The Fourteenth Amendment states, "nor
Additionally, chemical castration reduces male sex drive but does not prevent
erections or ejaculations. Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration:MPA
Treatment of the Sexual Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 (1990).
26. Freeman-Longo, supra note 19, at 314.
Specifically the statute
provides:
Any person guilty of a second conviction of any offense specified in
subdivision (c), where the victim has not attained 13 years of age, shall,
upon. parole, undergo medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or its
chemical equivalent, in addition to any other punishment prescribed for
that offense or any other provision of law.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) (West 1996).
27. Depo-Provera is the trade name for medroxyprogesterone acetate, a
type of progesterone. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 2.
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1996). Specifically, "[t]he parolee shall
begin medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment one week prior to his or her
release from confinement in the state prison or other institution and shall
continue treatments until the Department of Corrections demonstrates to the
Board of Prison Terms that this treatment is no longer necessary." Id. §
645(d).
29. Paraphiliacs are individuals who engage in deviant sexual behavior to
fulfill a specific and highly developed sexual fantasy. See Fitzgerald, supra
note 25, at 2 (reviewing the administration and effects of Depo-Provera in the
treatment of paraphiliacs and promoting it as a probation alternative).
30. Id.
31. See John McD. W. Bradford, The Hormonal Treatment of Sexual
Offenders, 11 BULL. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & THE L. 159, 161-63
(1983) (documenting the results of initial studies of Depo-Provera in the
treatment of sex offenders). Research on the effectiveness of Depo-Provera
began in the United States in the 1960s at Johns Hopkins Hospital. Rhonda
L. Rundle, Medicine: Will 'Chemical Castration' Really Work?, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 19, 1996, at B1. The drug is still being administered as part of the
treatment program at the Johns Hopkins Sexual Disorders Clinic under the
supervision of Dr. Fred Berlin. Id.
32. Laws of Impotence, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1996, at 18.
33. Burt Herman, California's Plan for Chemical Castration of Sex
Offenders Stirs Up Protests, STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 30, 1996, at 5. While
California's statute has been challenged as violating the Eighth Amendment
and the First Amendment, these constitutional arguments are outside the
scope of this Comment. See Raymond A. Lombardo, Note, California's
Unconstitutional Punishment for Heinous Crimes: Chemical Castration of
Sexual Offenders, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2612 (1997) (arguing chemical
castration violates the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
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shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."34 The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Due Process Clause to guarantee the fundamental right of
privacy.35 An individual's right to refuse medical treatment is
encompassed by this privacy right.36 A state cannot infringe upon
a fundamental right unless it draws its regulation narrowly
enough to further only a compelling state interest. 37
This Comment demonstrates that the California statute
impermissibly infringes upon a sex offender's privacy right to
refuse medical treatment. Part I discusses the administration of
Depo-Provera in the treatment of paraphiliac sex offenders and its
effectiveness in reducing recidivism. Part II addresses the judicial
and legislative adoption of Depo-Provera as an alternative
sentence for sex offenders. Part III examines the sex offender's
privacy right to refuse unwanted medical treatment protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part III also analyzes the
constitutional test of strict scrutiny to determine when the forced
administration of medication may comport with due process. This
Comment concludes by applying the strict scrutiny standard to
California's chemical castration statute, and explains why the
statute fails to pass constitutional muster. Finally, Part IV of this
Comment proposes amendments to California's statute that not
only address the current problem of recidivism, but also will
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
I.

CHEMICAL CASTRATION: DEPO-PROVERA AS TREATMENT FOR SEX
OFFENDERS

Depo-Provera is the trade name for medroxyprogesterone
acetate, a synthetic progesterone 3 originally developed and
manufactured by the Upjohn Company as a female contraceptive
device.39' Although used widely around the world, 0 Depo-Provera's
Clause). But see Kenneth B. Fromson, Note, Beyond an Eye for an Eye:
Castrationas an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
311, 317-22 (1994) (asserting chemical castration is not cruel and unusual
punishment); G. L. Stelzer, Note, Chemical Castration and the Right to
Generate Ideas: Does the First Amendment Protect the Fantasies of Convicted
Pedophiles?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1675 (1997) (applying First Amendment
analysis to the California statute and arguing that chemical castration does
not violate freedom of speech).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with the Court that the right of privacy is a
fundamental constitutional right).
36. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997).
37. Id. at 2268.
38. Progesterone is a steroid sex hormone that prepares the uterus for
fertilization during the menstrual cycle. MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA &
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING & ALLIED HEALTH 1220 (5th ed. 1992).
39. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 2.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:381

possible side effects prevented its approval for use as a
contraceptive for women in the United States until recently.41
When administered to men, Depo-Provera reduces the level of
testosterone 4' in two ways: it decreases the production of
testosterone in the testes, 3 and it increases the metabolism of
testosterone by the liver." The physiological result is a lowered
sex drive and a reduction in sexual fantasy and imagery.45
Dr. John Money was the first researcher to use Depo-Provera
in the treatment of sex offenders in the United States.46 In 1966,
Dr. Money administered the drug to a bisexual transvestite who
was in therapy for engaging in incestuous activity with his sixyear-old son."7 Dr. Money's success led to subsequent studies
which demonstrated that the administration of Depo-Provera
could be an effective tool in the treatment of paraphiliacs.48
Paraphiliacs are one type of sex offender driven by a
compulsion to realize a specific sexual fantasy.49 Because a
number of causes may motivate sexually deviant behavior, the
diagnosis of an individual as a paraphiliac cannot be made simply

40. Id. at 8. Depo-Provera is used in over 80 countries as a contraceptive
device. Id.
41. Laws of Impotence, supra note 32, at 18. Initially, the FDA denied
approval due to testing on beagles and monkeys that showed a link to cancer.
Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 8.
42. Testosterone is the principal hormone produced by cells in the testes.
Bradford, supra note 31, at 159. Testosterone controls the production of sperm
and the maturation of secondary sex characteristics. Id. Medical research
supports a relationship between testosterone levels and sex drive. Id. at 161.
43. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 6. Depo-Provera decreases testosterone
production by hindering the pituitary secretion of the lutenizing hormone (LH)
and the follicle stimulating hormone (FSH) in the brain. Id. LH stimulates
the production of testosterone; FSH stimulates the production of sperm.
Bradford, supra note 31, at 159.
44. Daniel L. Icenogle, M.D., Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of
Biological Treatments, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 279, 284 (1994).
45. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 6. Weekly injections of approximately 500
mg reduce the amount of hormones in men to a prepubescent level. Id.
46. Rundle, supra note 31, at B1. Dr. Money was a renowned professor at
Johns Hopkins University. Id.
47. Bradford, supra note 31, at 162.
48. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 8-9. A study at the Johns Hopkins Sexual
Disorders Clinic of 600 paraphiliacs showed a less than 10% rate of recidivism.
Icenogle, supra note 44, at 285.
49. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 2. There are four classifications of sex
offenders. Id. at 4. Type I denies that his act is criminal. Id. Type II admits
the criminal act but blames it on nonsexual forces like drugs and alcohol. Id.
Type III is the violent offender motivated by rage and aggression. Id. Type IV
is the paraphiliac who demonstrates a pattern of sexual arousal beginning at
puberty.
Id.
Types of paraphilia include pedophilia, exhibitionism,
transvestitism, voyeurism, fetishism, sexual sadism and sexual masochism.
Id. at 4-5.
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by examining the individual's outward behavior."
Instead,
diagnosis requires a comprehensive evaluation of the individual's
cognitive, emotional and behavioral states.5 If an offender is a
paraphiliac, an evaluation of his cognitive state will reveal a
fantasy; an evaluation of his emotional state will uncover the
sexual craving he fulfills by enacting that fantasy; and an
evaluation of his behavioral state will show the precise method he
uses to act out the fantasy." Depo-Provera reduces the sexual
imagery experienced by a sex offender. 3 Thus, the motivation
behind the deviant sexual behavior is diminished, thereby
increasing the individual's amenability to treatment. 4 Proper
diagnosis of the offender as a paraphiliac is critical because a
decrease in sexual imagery will not affect those individuals
motivated by other forces, such as rage or psychosis."
Physiologically, Depo-Provera causes the patient to
experience fewer erections and ejaculations, and it reduces sperm
count." Unlike surgical castration, Depo-Provera does not produce
complete impotency. 7 The offender can still engage in sexual
activity and criminal sexual behavior while being treated with the
drug.5" Additionally, all effects of Depo-Provera are completely
reversible upon the cessation of treatment." Within seven to ten
days after termination, testosterone production increases and the
offender is again aware of an increased sex drive and sexual
fantasies." Depo-Provera alone will not effectively treat most sex
offenders. 6 Therefore, to maximize its effectiveness, Depo-Provera
must be combined with individualized psychotherapy."
Depo-Provera treatment also requires close medical

50. Id. at 5. For example, rape may be motivated by rage or psychosis
rather than a response to a sexual fantasy. Icenogle, supra note 44, at 281-82.
51. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 5.
52. Id. All of the paraphiliac's fantasies must be analyzed to ensure that

the offender does not simply replace one with another. Id.
53. Bradford, supra note 31, at 163.
54. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 2-3.
55. Icenogle, supra note 44, at 281-82. Studies indicate that Depo-Provera
treatment is only effective for those who suffer a loss of self-control pertaining

to the fulfillment of a sexual fantasy, not those motivated for other reasons to
engage in criminal sexual behavior. Id. at 281.
56. Bradford, supra note 31, at 163; Icenogle, supra note 44, at 285.

57. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 7. Individuals receiving treatment
experience only "erotic apathy" and do not have spontaneous erections. Id.
58. Freeman-Longo, supra note 19, at 314. As a result, Depo-Provera is

combined with specialized therapy in a complete treatment plan. Id. at 31415.
59. Bradford, supra note 31, at 163. Upon cessation of medication, follow
up studies have shown a dramatic increase in deviant sexual conduct. Id.
60. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 7.
61. Freeman-Longo, supra note 19, at 314.

62. Id.
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supervision as it may result in significant adverse side effects. 3
Major effects include weight gain, hot and cold flashes,
nightmares, fatigue, leg cramps, nausea, headaches and
depression."
Continued use can result in phlebitis,65
66
hyperglycemia,
dyspnea, 7
hypogodnadism,66
and
9
70
cerebrovascular disorders.
Depo-Provera can also aggravate
epilepsy, asthma, cardiac dysfunction and renal dysfunction.7
While no study has indicated the drug is carcinogenic to humans,
studies do link Depo-Provera to breast cancer in beagles and
uterine cancer in monkeys. 2
Because of these possible
complications, administration of Depo-Provera requires ongoing
medical supervision."
Depo-Provera treatment of sex offenders is both hailed and
condemned by the medical community.74 Proponents of the drug
argue that the treatment can significantly reduce the recurrence of
criminal sexual behavior. 75 However, this evidence is the result of
only small-scale or individual case studies. 6 In those studies,
researchers chose participants after an evaluation of their
63. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 2080-82 (5 1st ed. 1997).

64. Bradford, supra note 31, at 163; Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 7.
65. Phlebitis is the inflammation of a vein which interferes with normal
blood flow. MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE,
NURSING & ALLIED HEALTH 1148 (5th ed. 1992).
66. Hyperglycemia is an abnormal amount of glucose in the blood. Id. at
718.
67. Dyspnea is difficulty in breathing, usually associated with respiratory
infections or pulmonary diseases. Id. at 460.
68. Hypogonadism is the retardation in development of the gonads or
testes. Id. at 624, 732.
69. Cerebrovascular disorders are conditions impairing blood supply to the
brain. Id. at 279.
70. Bradford, supra note 31, at 163; Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 7.
71. Bradford, supra note 31, at 163. The drug can cause water retention
which aggravates these conditions. Id.
72. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 8.
73. Freeman-Longo, supra note 19, at 315.
74. See Icenogle, supra note 44, at 285-86 (comparing the results of two
studies involving chemical castration).
Researchers at Johns Hopkins
Hospital have used Depo-Provera to treat sex offenders since the treatment
was initiated by Dr. Money in 1966. Rundle, supra note 31, at B1. However,
Richard Seely, director of a Minnesota psychotherapeutic program, feels, "[a]s
the next step up from the vindictive barbarism of castration, Depo-Provera
leaves me with little hope." Michael S. Serrill, Castration or Incarceration?
Three Rapists Face What Critics Call a Cruel and Useless Punishment, TIME,
Dec. 12, 1983, at 70.
75. Lacitis, supra note 5, at D1. The recidivism rate for sex offenders
released from incarceration without any treatment is as high as 85%. Serrill,
supra note 74, at 70. For offenders undergoing Depo-Provera treatment, the
recidivism rate is less than 15%. Id. This rate was the finding of a three and
one-half year study conducted by Dr. Fred Berlin at the Johns Hopkins Sexual
Disorder Clinic. Id.
76. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 9-10.
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amenability to treatment and also required the participants to
undergo psychotherapy to alter their behavior." Any long-term
side effects are unknown and there are no large-scale studies of
the drug's effectiveness on recidivism.' Some experts still believe
the only effective solution to the problem of recidivist sex offenders
is confinement and intensive psychotherapy.' 9 As a result, DepoProvera should not be viewed as a cure-all.8 °
II. LEGISLATIVE ADOPTION OF DEPO-PROVERA IN SENTENCING
Interest in Depo-Provera as a potential treatment for repeat
sex offenders is not limited to the medical community. Recently,
the legislative and judicial systems have also looked to DepoProvera as an answer to the high rate of recidivism among sex
This Part discusses the legislative and judicial
offenders.
attempts to use Depo-Provera treatment as an alternative
sentencing device, focusing on California's chemical castration
statute. Section A reviews judicial attempts to solve the problem
of recidivism. Section B discusses California's statutory solutionthe enactment of its chemical castration statute. Section C
examines the medical and legal community's reaction to this
California statute.
A.

The Search for Sentencing Alternatives

Castration of prisoners is not a novel concept to the legislative
or judicial systems." Involuntary castration was a statutorily
authorized form of punishment" in many states until the Supreme
Court declared such statutes unconstitutional. 83 Responding to
77. Lacitis, supra note 5, at D1; Serrill, supra note 74, at 70.
78. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 9-10.
79. Serrill, supra note 74, at 70.
80. McCormick, supra note 18, at 30.
81. Stacy Russell, Comment, Castration of Repeat Sexual Offenders: An
InternationalComparativeAnalysis, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 425, 440 (1997). The
states began castrating prisoners around 1899. Id.
82. One such statute was Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 171 (West 1991). A habitual criminal was an
individual convicted two or more times of a felony involving "moral turpitude."
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). The statute provided for the
attorney general to initiate a proceeding to obtain a judgment allowing for the
sterilization of the criminal. Id. This sterilization was sought to prevent
criminal tendencies from being transmitted to offspring. Id. at 537-38.
83. Id. at 538. In Skinner, the state's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act
was attacked on constitutional grounds. Id. at 537-38. Though the court
recognized a protected liberty interest in the right to procreate, the Court
instead rested its decision upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 541. Under the statute, larceny was considered a crime of
moral turpitude while embezzlement was not. Id. at 538-39. The court
determined that these offenses were similar and yet only one class of offenders
was deprived of the right to procreate. Id. at 541. See also Mickle v. Henrichs,
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reports that incarceration is ineffective in rehabilitating sex
offenders,84 courts have again turned to castration to control
deviant sexual behavior, albeit on a voluntary basis.8" Courts are
utilizing both surgical and chemical castration procedures as
alternative sentencing devices.86
Judicial attempts to offer castration as either an alternative
to incarceration, or as a condition of probation, have received
national attention in recent years.87
Texas Judge Michael
McSpadden drew harsh criticism from the legal and medical
communities when he offered convicted rapist Steven Allen Butler
probation instead of prison if Butler voluntarily underwent
surgical castration.' Unable to find a doctor willing to perform the
surgery, the judge retracted the offer.8"
A Michigan judge
262 F. 687, 691 (D. Nev. 1918) (striking down as cruel and unusual
punishment a statute requiring vasectomies for rapists).
84. The recidivism rate for sex offenders who are only incarcerated is as
high as 85%. Serrill, supra note 74, at 70.
85. Fromson, supra note 33, at 313-14.
86. Id. See also Icenogle, supra note 44, at 288-93 (outlining cases that
have discussed the use of Depo-Provera treatment for sex offenders).
87. Serrill, supra note 74, at 70. In South Carolina, Judge C. Victor Pyle
imposed a 30 year prison sentence upon three defendants who pled guilty to a
brutal six hour gang rape. Id. The judge sent shock waves through the court
room, however, when he added an offer to suspend the sentence if the
defendants would voluntarily submit to surgical castration. Id. The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the sentence on appeal because it violated
the state constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. South
Carolina v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (S.C. 1985). Even as recently as
September 1997, a charged child-sex offender requested surgical castration in
exchange for a reduced sentence. Janan Hanna, Judge Rejects Castrationfor
Child-Sex Defendant, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 1997, at 1. Because the court is not
authorized to enter into a plea agreement with a defendant under Illinois law,
the judge rejected the offer. Id. The judge stated, "[tlhe defendant is trying to
play 'Let's Make a Deal' with the court. The bottom line is the court does not
play 'Let's Make a Deal'." Id. Chemical castration received national focus
when a jury sentenced Joseph Frank Smith for rape in Texas. Serrill, supra
note 74, at 70. Known as the 'ski-mask rapist', Smith confessed to raping the
same woman on two separate occasions. Paul Hoversten, Calif Targets Child
Molesters: Bill Requires for Chemical Castration,USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 1996,
at 03A; Chemically Castrated Rapist Lives Quiet Life, SAN DIEGO UNION &
TRIB., Dec. 8, 1983, at A43. After Smith volunteered to undergo a DepoProvera treatment program at Johns Hopkins Hospital, the jury imposed 10
years probation rather than incarceration. Serrill, supra note 74, at 70.
88. Richard Lacayo, Sentences Inscribed on Flesh (Castration for Sex
Offenders), TIME, Mar. 23, 1992, at 54. While on probation for child
molestation, Butler was charged with the rape of a 13 year-old girl. Id.
Facing a trial and possible plea-bargained 35 year sentence, Butler accepted
the offer to undergo castration. Id. Legal experts condemned the offer as
"barbaric," fearing "the implications of allowing prisoners to barter body parts
for their freedom." Id.; Choosing Castration (Convicted Rapist Steven Allen
Butler), TIME, Mar. 16, 1992, at 33.
89. Man Who Sought Surgical Castration Gets Life Sentence for Raping
Girl, 13, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 8, 1992, at 30A. Butler was convicted
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sentenced Roger Gauntlett,9 ° convicted for engaging in sexual
intercourse with his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, to five years
probation conditioned upon Gauntlett being chemically castrated.9 '
Gauntlett challenged the Depo-Provera condition on constitutional
grounds; however, the appellate court never reached that
argument.9 2 Instead, the court determined the condition was
unlawful since Depo-Provera had not gained acceptance in the
medical community as a safe and reliable procedure.9 In an Ohio
rape case, a judge proposed Depo-Provera treatment during
sentencing, but the defendant refused to consent to the program.94
The appellate court upheld the trial judge's decision to consider
this refusal as a lack of rehabilitative potential, justifying a
harsher sentence. 95
B. California'sStatutory Solution
Frustrated by these unsuccessful judicial attempts at
alternative sentencing, assemblyman Bill Hoge introduced a bill in
California requiring involuntary chemical castration upon parole
for certain types of child molesters. 96 In support of the bill, Hoge
for aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to life in prison. Id.
90. Ironically, Gauntlett is the heir to the Upjohn Company which markets
Depo-Provera. Rundle, supra note 31, at B1.
91. People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 311, 313 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
Gauntlett was also charged with three counts of criminal sexual conduct for
fondling his 12-year-old stepson. Id. at 311. These counts were dismissed in
exchange for a plea of guilty. Id.
92. Id. at 314. Gauntlett argued the condition was "unconstitutional as
cruel and unusual punishment, a violation of fundamental rights of liberty,
privacy, bodily integrity, equal protection and procedural and substantive due
process." Id.
93. Id. at 316. The court noted that the only studies of Depo-Provera
involved volunteer participants who were also undergoing psychotherapy. Id.
at 315. Furthermore, at least one of these studies was later criticized because
11 of the 20 participants dropped out of treatment or relapsed. Id.
94. Ohio v. Thompson, No. 1378, 1988 WL 88350, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
19, 1988). The defendant was indicted for raping a child under the age of 13
and for gross sexual imposition. Id. at * 1. He pled guilty to attempted rape in
exchange for a dismissal of the remaining counts against him and a sentencing
recommendation of incarceration for no less than three years but not more
than fifteen. Id.
95. Id. at *3. The judge sentenced the defendant to prison for a minimum
of six years. Id. at *1.
96. Van Biema & Bonfante, supra note 1, at 60. Hoge introduced the bill
out of frustration over the story of Larry Don McQuay. Id. McQuay was
sentenced to an eight year prison term for child molestation. Christy Hoppe,
Molesters Seeking Castration: Texas Examining Laws on Sex Offenders,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 13, 1995, at 45A.

While in prison, McQuay

admitted to committing over 200 acts of child molestation and requested the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice to pay for a surgical castration
procedure. Russell, supra note 81, at 428. When his request was denied,
McQuay began a letter campaign from prison to obtain the surgery. Hoppe,
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cited studies from European countries reporting recidivism rates
as low as two percent for treated offenders as opposed to the
normal rate of fifty percent for untreated offenders.97 "Child
molestation is a heinous crime and must be stopped," argued
Hoge." "Where are the rights of those who have been molested?
By God, this is a bill that's going to address that."99
Under the terms of the California chemical castration statute,
an individual convicted twice of a sexual crime involving a victim
under thirteen years of age must undergo hormonal treatment
upon parole.0 0 It is within the court's discretion to impose the
condition on a first-time offender.'' The treatment is to continue
for the life of the offender or until a finding by the Board of Prison
Terms that the injections are no longer necessary."2 A convicted
offender is exempt from the provisions1 3 of the statute if he
voluntarily undergoes surgical castration. 0
Governor Pete Wilson signed the bill on September 17, 1996,
and it became effective January 1, 1997." A spokesman for the
governor asserted, "[i]f we can prevent just one child from being a
victim of a molestation ... then chemical castration has
worked .... Chemical castration is a common-sense step toward
eliminating the sick impulse among our most dangerous
criminals."' The estimated annual cost of the treatment is $2380
per parolee." 6
supra, at 45A. His letters prompted a citizen's group, Justice for All, to help
him raise the needed funds. Russell, supra note 81, at 428-29. Although the
group succeeded in obtaining funding, they were unable to find a physician

willing to perform the surgery. Id. at 429.
97. WOMEN'S COALITION, SENATE RULES COMM., REPORT ON CAL.
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).
98. Will Chemical Castration Stop Sex Offenders?, JET, Sept. 23, 1996, at

16, 16.
99. Id.
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(b) (West 1996). The specific crimes are sodomy
(§ 286(c) and (d)); committing a lewd act upon the body of a child by use of
force with the intent of arousing that child (§ 288(a)); oral copulation (§
288a(b) or (d)) and genital or anal penetration (§ 289(a) and (j)).
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(a) (West 1996).

102. Id. § 645(d).
103. Id. § 645(e).
104. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 596 (A.B. 3339) (West) (codified as CAL.
PENAL CODE § 645); Mike Lewis, The New Castration Civil Libertarians
Prepareto Challenge Mandatory Hormone Treatments for Some Sex Offenders,
CAL. LAW., Jan. 1997, at 21. After meeting with almost unanimous approval

in both houses, the bill passed the State Assembly by a 51-8 vote. Herman,
supra note 33, at 5; Vincent J. Schodolski, California OKs 'Castration'Bill:
Foes Doubt Legality of Punishment for Molesters, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1996, at

1.
105. Janan Hanna & Susan Kuczka, Defendant Offers Castration as
Sentence: Child-Sex Case Suspect Raises Many Questions, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31,

1996, at 1.
106. WOMEN'S COALITION,

SENATE RULES COMM.,

REPORT

ON CAL.
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C. Reaction to California'sStatute
Since its proposal, California's chemical castration statute
has met resistance on medical, legal and practical grounds.0 7
Significantly, not one law enforcement agency supports the
statute. 01 8 These opponents question the effectiveness of chemical
castration in sentencing."' 9 They assert that previously cited
studies fail to establish the drug's effects when administered on an
involuntary basis.1 Furthermore, the statute fails to distinguish
among the various types of sex offenders. 1
Administration of
Depo-Provera or other hormonal agents is an ineffective treatment
for offenders motivated by anger and aggression. 12 This emphasis
on an offender's sex drive "misfocuses the issue and feeds into
myths about rape. Sexual assault is a crime of violence and
aggression ... not the product of an uncontrollable sex drive.
Even medical experts who promote the drug in treatment
oppose its involuntary administration.""
The California
Psychiatric Association argues that the state has usurped the
judgment of doctors by forcing medication on sex offenders without
a determination of its potential effectiveness or the individual's
physical toleration for the drug.11 Depo-Provera can result in
dangerous side effects and requires medical supervision. 6 Other

ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).

Since this treatment could last
for the lifetime of the parolee, the costs of the treatment would increase each
year beyond the number of paroled individuals. Id.
107. Laws of Impotence, supra note 32, at 18.
108. WOMEN'S COALITION, SENATE RULES COMM., REPORT ON CAL.

ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996). This argument was presented by
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in committee hearings on the bill.
Id. The ACLU stated it would support the bill if amended to permit only
voluntary injections combined with counseling. Id.
109. Hanna & Kuczka, supra note 105, at 1. "This bill has huge holes in it,"
stated an ACLU advocate. "There's no evidence that forcibly chemically
castrating someone will actually work, especially for someone who is not

motivated by sexual urges." Id.
110. Craig Turk, Kinder Cut, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 12.

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. WOMEN'S

COALITION,

SENATE

RULES

COMM.,

REPORT

ON

CAL.

ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996) (quoting Denise Snyder, executive
director of the D.C. Rape Crisis Center).
114. WOMEN'S

COALITION,

SENATE

COMM.

ON

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE,

REPORT ON CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996). Dr. Fred Berlin

advocates the use of Depo-Provera in treating sex offenders.

Id. Berlin,

however, opposes the "imposition of Depo-Provera treatment upon an
unwilling individual.., in the absence of medical testimony that such
treatment was appropriate, and in the absence of prior agreement from the

prospective patient that he was interested in receiving it." Id.
115. WOMEN'S COALITION, SENATE RULES COMM., REPORT
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).

116. Id.

ON

CAL.
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medical experts contend that the evidence of the drug's
effectiveness in reducing the rate of recidivism and increasing
safety to the community is insufficient to justify forced
"Just as one should not attempt to force
administration.117
antipsychotic medications upon a nonpsychotic individual,
physicians should never attempt to force Depo-Provera treatment
upon an unwilling person.""8
Involuntary medical treatment imposed by statute requires
doctors to serve as agents of the state, raising ethical
considerations. "9 Physicians may not be willing to prescribe a
"highly questionable drug with numerous side effects to an
involuntary patient."1 0
This objection leads to practical
considerations such as, who would administer the injections if
doctors refuse? 1' Also, what is the probability that an unwilling
individual will show up2 for these weekly injections over an
indefinite period of time?"
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) asserts that
treatment with Depo-Provera can result in dangerous side
effects. 12
The state is exposing sex offenders to these risks
without any evidence that chemical castration is effective on
unwilling individuals. 4
By indiscriminately forcing medical
treatment on parolees, the statute infringes on fundamental
constitutional rights.1" The statute is a "knee-jerk reaction" based
16
on strong emotions rather than proof of the drug's effectiveness. 2
Surprisingly, challenges to California's chemical castration

117.

WOMEN'S

COALITION,

SENATE

COMM.

ON

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE,

REPORT ON CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).

118. Id. (citing Dr. Fred Berlin).
119. Diane M. Gianelli, Castration for Sex Offenders: Questions Arise Over
Effectiveness, Appropriateness, Ethics, AM. MED. NEWS, April 13, 1992, at 2, 2.

120. Mary Lynne Vellinga, 'Castration'Law Under Fire 'Cartoon Solution',
SACRAMENTO

BEE,

Feb. 4, 1997, at Al.

Barbara Schwartz, who runs the

sexual offender program for the Department of Corrections in Massachusetts,
expressed this concern. Id.
121. WOMEN'S COALITION,

SENATE COMM. ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).

REPORT ON CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL NO.

122. Id.
123. Van Biema & Bonfante, supra note 1, at 60. The ACLU also contends

that the effects of Depo-Provera could be reversed by the offender consuming
other drugs. Id.

124. Hanna & Kuczka, supra note 105, at

1; WOMEN'S COALITION, SENATE
REPORT ON CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).
125. WOMEN'S COALITION, SENATE RULES COMM., REPORT ON CAL.

RULES COMM.,

ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996). The ACLU has attacked the
statute as violating the right to privacy, the right to procreate and the right to
bodily integrity and as constituting cruel and unusual punishment.

Van

Biema & Bonfante, supra note 1, at 60; Herman, supra note 33, at 5.
126. Vellinga, supra note 120, at Al; Editorial:Castrationor Incarceration?,
NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 21, 1996, at 3, [hereinafter Castration or
Incarceration?].
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statute have been limited to medical and legal experts. 7 Some
victim's rights groups support the bill and plan to lobby for its
expansion to include all rapists." 8 The American public also
appears to support this involuntary medication. 29 This popular
support has encouraged Florida, Louisiana and Georgia to enact
legislation patterned after California's statute.'
A dozen other
states have introduced similar bills.' 1 Unless the courts strike
down such legislation, this trend will likely continue.'
127. Castrationor Incarceration?,supra note 126, at 3.
128. Herman, supra note 33, at 5. The bill was drafted and supported by the
California chapter of the Women's Coalition. Id. Frustrated by the early
release of 'pillow case rapist' Reginald Muldrew, the Coalition consulted his
victims to ask what they wanted to see happen to Muldrew. Schodolski, supra
note 104, at 1. The victims wanted to have him castrated so the Coalition
began lobbying for such measures. Id. The group eventually wants a broader
bill which will apply to all rapists. Herman, supra note 33, at 5. A
spokesperson for the Coalition asserted, "[i]f this doesn't pass, we'll bring it
back again and again and again. We're not talking about cutting off their
testicles. Maybe someday, but not now." Id.
129. Castration or Incarceration?, supra note 126, at 3. In a survey of
American voters conducted by Princeton Survey Research, 59% of those polled
supported surgical or chemical castration for repeat sex offenders. Many
Approve Caning, Castration,CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, June, 1994.

130. Florida's and Louisiana's statutes require involuntary treatment upon a
second offense subject to a determination by a physician that the drug is
medically appropriate. Act of May 30, 1997, ch. 97, § 184, 1997 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 794.0235); Act of July 10, 1997, ch.
746, 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 746 (West) (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ch.
15, § 538). Montana's statute does not require a medical evaluation but leaves
it within the discretion of the judge whether to impose treatment upon a first
or second offense. Act of April 19, 1997, ch. 334, 1997 Mont. Sess. Law Serv.
(West) (to be codified at MONT. LAWS ch. 45-5). Georgia has enacted a statute
allowing chemical castration as a term of parole only upon the consent of the
offender. GA. CODE ANN. 16-6-4 (1997). Texas recently enacted a law allowing
recidivist child molesters to submit to voluntary surgical castration.
Associated Press, Bush Signs Child Molester Castration Bill, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, May 21, 1997, at 6. The law requires offenders to submit to
a mental health examination and to consent in writing. Id.
131. Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, New York,

Oklahoma, South Carolina and Washington have bills pending which are
identical to California's statute. S. 116, 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 1997); H. 2216,
43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1997); S.215, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997); S. 503,
77th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (Iowa 1997); S.2465, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1997); H.
753, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997); S.4925, 220 Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1997); S. 633, 46th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1997); H. 3090, 112th Gen.

Assembly (S.C. 1997); S. 5352, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).

Colorado and Oregon have bills pending requiring involuntary treatment
subject to a medical evaluation. H. 1133, 61st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.
(Col. 1997); H. 3672, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997). Nevada's and Vermont's
bills provide only for voluntary participation in Depo-Provera treatment
programs. H. 206, 69th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1997); H. 212, 64th Leg.,

Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997).
132. Hoversten, supra note 87, at 03A. According to the National Conference
of State Legislatures, "[i]f one state does it and is able to do it successfully and
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III. PRIVACY INTERESTS: THE RIGHT TO REFUSE UNWANTED
MEDICAL TREATMENT

The framers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone -the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.131
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."134 This clause secures more than fair
procedural process, however. 135
Due process also contains a
substantive guarantee against state interference with an
individual's fundamental rights." 6 The clause recognizes that
there is a "realm of personal liberty which the government may
not enter."'37 The "full scope of liberty" is not limited to those
interests already guaranteed in explicit terms by the Bill of Rights
or elsewhere in the Constitution. 13 Instead, liberty is a "rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." 39
Although the term "right of privacy" does not appear in the
text of the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions have recognized
that the Constitution guarantees certain zones of personal
privacy. 4 ° In Roe v. Wade, the Court found the unwritten
constitutional right of privacy to be rooted in "the personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action" of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
However, the Court also recognized that past
prevail in the courts, then that's a track record that other states might look
at." Id.
133. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
135. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997) (finding
that the right to physician assisted suicide is not a fundamental right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
136. Id.
137. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992) (reaffirming the holding of Roe v. Wade and ruling on provisions of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act).
138. Id. at 847-48. Additionally, the fundamental rights encompassed in the
Fourteenth Amendment are not limited to only those interests protected by
other rules at the time the Amendment was adopted. Id.
139. Id. at 848-49 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
140. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding the right of privacy
encompasses a woman's right to choose whether or not to have an abortion).
141. Id. at 152-53.
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decisions
pointed
to the
First Amendment,"'
Fourth
Amendment,'43 Fifth Amendment,' Ninth Amendment14"' and the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights 46 as the source of the right of
privacy. 14 7 Regardless of its origin, the right of privacy is
fundamental and therefore can only include other personal rights
deemed fundamental.4 8 This privacy right encompasses the right
to marry, to have children, to use contraception, to bodily
integrity, to choose to have 1an
abortion and to refuse unwanted
49
lifesaving medical treatment.
However, the right to privacy is not absolute. A state is
permitted to infringe upon this fundamental right only if its
regulation withstands "strict constitutional scrutiny."" ° This test
142. Under the First Amendment, "[c]ongress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
143. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
144. Under the Fifth Amendment:
[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. The Ninth Amendment states, "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Ninth Amendment to show that additional fundamental rights exist which
are protected from governmental interference, although not specifically
enumerated in the first eight amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 488 (1965).
146. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-84 (suggesting that the enumerated
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras or peripheral rights without
which the specific rights would be less meaningful and less protected). The
right of association and freedom to teach are both penumbras of the First
Amendment. Id. at 482.
147. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
148. Id. Once a right is labeled fundamental the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids governmental infringement "at all, no matter what process is provided,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest." Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997).
149. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53; Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2267.
150. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 829 (1992)
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requires more than a rational relationship between a regulation
and a legitimate state purpose. 5' Strict scrutiny first requires a
state to demonstrate a compelling, subordinating interest. 5 2 Then,
the state must establish that the regulation is both narrowly
drawn and necessary to further this interest.158 If a less restrictive
or "less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose" is
available, then courts must strike the regulation down as

unconstitutional. 14
California's chemical castration statute infringes on a sex
offender's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
The
constitutionality of the statute turns on the balance struck
between this privacy right and any compelling state interests.
This Part explores this balance to determine if the statute is a
permissible or an unjustified infringement of a sex offender's
constitutional rights. Section A discusses the historical origins of
the privacy interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.
Section B reviews the elements of the strict constitutional scrutiny
standard and the Supreme Court's application of this test. Section
C subjects California's statute to strict constitutional scrutiny and
concludes that it does not meet due process guidelines.
A. The Interests at Stake
The right of privacy encompasses only fundamental rights. 55
A right is fundamental when it is so rooted in the "traditions and
conscience" of the Nation that it "cannot be denied without
violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice." 6 To
determine if an individual's interest in avoiding unwanted medical
treatment meets this standard,
a court reviews the Nation's
57
history and legal practices."
An individual's privacy interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment has its origins in the common law. 5' "No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. Court decisions recognize that some
state legislation in the constitutionally protected zones of privacy is
appropriate. Id.
151. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497.

152. Id.
153. Id. at 498; Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
154. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504 (White, J., concurring).
155. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.

156. Griswold,381 U.S. at 493.
157. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268.
158. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-79 (1990)
(outlining the history of the doctrine of informed consent and a
constitutionally protected interest in the right to refuse medical treatment).
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others ....""' In recognition of this right, courts expanded the
tort action of assault and battery to include the touching of an
individual without consent or legal justification. 160 In the early
1900s, courts began to apply assault and battery law to medical
procedures performed on an individual without his consent. 161
These early cases recognized that "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is
162
liable in damages."
It was not until the 1950's that court decisions expanded the
notion of patient autonomy to include the requirement of informed
consent.163 The courts developed this doctrine to address cases in
which a patient consents to a treatment without being informed of
its material risks.'
A necessary corollary to the doctrine of
informed consent is that a patient possesses the right to withhold
consent or to refuse medical treatment.16' Initial cases addressing
such refusal rested on a First Amendment right to refuse
treatment prohibited by the individual's religious beliefs."
The
first case to address a refusal apart from religious issues was In re
Quinlan.67
Karen Quinlan fell into a coma and remained in a vegetative

159. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
160. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269; ARTHUR S. BERGER, WHEN LIFE ENDS: LEGAL
OVERVIEWS, MEDICOLEGAL FORMS, AND HOSPITAL POLICIES 13 (1995).
161. See Elizabeth Sudbury Langston, Note, Torts-Changesin the Arkansas
Law of Informed Consent: What's Up Doc?, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 263,
269-70 (1997) (discussing the development of the doctrine of informed consent
and its application in early Arkansas court decisions). For example, in Rolater
v. Strain, a patient consented to a foot operation provided it would not require
the removal of any bone. Id. at 270. During the operation, the physician
believed removing the bone was necessary and did so. Id. The court found
this action to constitute a battery since the doctor had operated outside the
parameters of the patient's consent. Id.
162. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (quoting Cardozo's opinion in Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
163. See Lori B. Andrews, Informed Consent and the Decisionmaking
Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163, 175 (1984) (discussing the history of the
doctrine of informed consent and evaluating its assistance in patient decision
making).
164. Id. Now recognized as a negligence action, the doctrine requires a
physician to disclose all information material to a patient's decision to undergo
the proposed procedure. Id. at 171.
165. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270; BERGER, supra note 160, at 16.
166. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. These cases involved patients refusing blood
transfusions due to their religious beliefs. BERGER, supra note 160, at 18. The
judiciary will usually not interfere in such cases unless the practice of the
religious belief threatens the "morals, welfare, or health" of the community or
if minor children are involved. Id.
167. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:381

state with no hope for improvement. 168 Quinlan's father sought
judicial approval to disconnect his daughter's life-support
equipment. 69 The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the request
based on the constitutional right to privacy. 7 ° Noting this right
was broad enough to include a woman's choice to terminate
pregnancy, the court concluded that privacy issues also
encompassed the right to refuse medical treatment--even if it was
life-sustaining. 7' However, Quinlan's right was not absolute; it
had to be balanced against the state's compelling interests in
protecting life and preserving a physician's right to prescribe a
course of treatment.'72 Given the degree of bodily invasion and the
hopeless prognosis, the court concluded that Quinlan's privacy
right to refuse treatment was paramount. 171 Subsequent cases
continued to base the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment
on either a constitutional 1privacy
right or the common law
4
doctrine of informed consent.
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized a
privacy right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.'7' Nancy
Cruzan was in a vegetative state, so her parents sought judicial
leave to withdraw all artificial nutrition and hydration. 176 The
Missouri Supreme Court denied the request, stating that Cruzan's
parents failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
termination of the medical procedures comported with the
incompetent patient's wishes.'77
Upon review, the Court

168. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655. Quinlan was rushed to the hospital when

she stopped breathing for 15 minutes. Id. at 653-54. The lack of oxygen to the
blood during that interval caused severe brain damage and Quinlan slipped

into a coma. Id. at 654. The doctors were unable to ascertain what led to this
condition. Id. Quinlan lost all cognitive brain functions and could not survive
off of a respirator. Id. at 654-55.

169. Id. at 651.
170. Id. at 663, 672. Upon a determination by the attending physicians and
hospital ethics committee that Quinlan would remain in a vegetative state and
agreement by the family, Quinlan could be removed from life support. Id.

171. Id. at 663. The court noted that, although not specifically enumerated
in the Constitution, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutionally protected
right of privacy. Id. This privacy right was the underlying basis for the

Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. Id.
172. Id. at 663-64.
173. Id. at 664. The court distinguished that case from those involving blood
transfusions to save a life. Id. Those procedures required minimal invasion

and a maximum chance of recovery. Id.
174. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.

175. 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). Nancy Cruzan sustained severe injuries in a
car accident that resulted in permanent brain damage. Id. at 266. She
slipped into a vegetative state and required artificial hydration and nutrition.

Id.
176. Id. at 265.
177. Id. at 268-69. Cruzan's parents' claim was based on statements made
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recognized a constitutionally protected right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.'78 The right is not absolute, but must be
balanced against asserted state interests before determining if the
state has violated an individual's privacy right.'79 The Court
concluded that Missouri's requirement of a clear and 80convincing
burden of proof withstood strict constitutional scrutiny.'
The Court has recognized a right to refuse medical treatment
in another context as well. In Washington v. Harper, the Court
determined that a prisoner possessed "a significant liberty interest
in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'8'
The Court affirmed this decision in Riggins v. Nevada.'8' The
Court determined that, "absent a finding of overriding justification
and a determination of medical appropriateness," the Due Process
Clause guarantees a person in criminal custody the right to be free
from antipsychotic drugs."' The Court determined that states
must honor a prisoner's constitutional right to refuse unwanted
medication.18'

These decisions demonstrate that a convicted sex offender has
a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding unwanted medical
treatment. Determining that a fundamental right exists only
begins the inquiry. A court must then determine if the state
regulation withstands strict constitutional scrutiny.
B. Defining the Constitutional Test
To survive constitutional attack, California's regulation must
to her roommate concerning her desire to die under such circumstances. Id. at
268. Although the court recognized a common law right to refuse medical
treatment based on informed consent, it found these statements insufficient to
allow the petitioners to exercise their substituted judgment on Cruzan's
behalf. Id.
178. Id. at 279. Earlier Court decisions impliedly recognized a constitutional
right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291, 300 (1982) (refraining from deciding whether an involuntarily committed
mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication).
179. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
180. Id. at 282.
181. 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990). After the defendant's parole was revoked for
assault, he was sent to a correctional institute established to treat inmates
with serious mental disorders. Id. at 214. His treating physician sought to
administer antipsychotic medication to the defendant without his consent. Id.
Washington had established a procedure for involuntary treatment upon a
finding by a neutral committee that the inmate was suffering from a mental
illness and was dangerous to himself or others. Id. at 215. The defendant
argued that this procedure violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 217.
182. 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992).
183. Id. at 135. The Court relied on its discussion in Harper to guide its
decision since detainees would be afforded at least as much protection as
inmates under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
184. Id. at 155 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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satisfy the substantive standard of strict scrutiny. The first part
of this test requires a state to demonstrate a compelling interest
that the regulation seeks to further. Felce v. Fielder illustrates
possible compelling state interests that85 California seeks to
advance by its chemical castration statute. 1
In Felce, a parolee appealed a determination that mandatory
release parole could include a condition of forced injections 1of86
antipsychotic drugs absent a determination of medical necessity.
When considering this issue, the Felce court recognized the state
had an interest in using such drugs to protect the public from the
parolee's potentially violent behavior, to reduce crime and to help
the parolee reassimilate into the community. 18 The Harper court
also recognized a governmental interest in imposing appropriate
medical treatment on a prisoner to reduce the danger he poses to
himself, other inmates and prison personnel. 8 Neither court,
however, determined if these interests were compelling.
Assuming arguendo the above state interests are compelling,
the statute must still satisfy the second prong of the strict scrutiny
test. California must also demonstrate that its statute is both
narrowly drawn and necessary to further these interests.'89 If less
intrusive alternatives exist, then California's infringement upon a
sex offender's right to avoid involuntary chemical castration is
impermissible.' 9° The Supreme Court's decisions in Riggins and
Harperillustrate where this line should be drawn.
In Riggins, a pretrial detainee moved to suspend his
treatment with an antipsychotic drug until after trial based on his
Fourteenth Amendment rights.'
The state asserted the
continued medication was necessary to protect the state's interest9
in bringing an accused to trial and obtaining an adjudication.' '
On review, the Court did not make a final determination of the
substantive standards for determining when the forced
administration of drugs before trial satisfies due process.'93 The
Court did, however, postulate that the state would have satisfied

185. 974 F.2d 1484 (1992).

186. Id. at 1488.
187. Id. at 1495. Nevertheless the court found the parole procedures
insufficient to guard against an erroneous decision that the parolee was an
appropriate subject for treatment. Id. at 1498. At no time was the medical
data subject to evaluation by a neutral decision maker. Id. at 1499. Instead,
the persons who made the decision to condition mandatory release parole on
drug treatment were involved in the parolee's diagnosis. Id.
188. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990).

189. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
190. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
191. 504 U.S. 127, 130 (1992). Prior to this motion, Riggins was found
competent to stand trial. Id.
192. Id. at 130, 135-36.
193. Id. at 135.

1999]

Chemical Castrationfor Repeat Sex Offenders

due process if the treatment was medically appropriate and,
considering the absence of less intrusive alternatives, essential for
the safety of the detainee or the safety of others."
In Harper, a prisoner contested a state regulation allowing for
the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs on
inmates. 95 The Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause
protects a prisoner's fundamental right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.96'
However, this clause does not confer a
greater right than state law, so the Court focused its analysis upon
the state-created liberty interest.1 97 Nevertheless, the Harper
decision illustrates under what conditions due process allows; a
state to involuntarily treat an inmate with antipsychotic drugs.
The Court emphasized that substantive due process guarantees
prohibit the forced administration of such drugs on all inmates,
except those who are mentally ill and whose medical needs are
furthered by such treatment. 98 The state's regulation satisfied
these due process requirements.'"
M

C. Strict Scrutiny Applied to California'sStatute
Application of the strict scrutiny test to California's statute
first requires a court to decide if California has a compelling state
interest. California can argue that its chemical castration statute
seeks to further its interests in protecting the public, reducing
crime and reintegrating the parolee into society. Assuming the
court finds these interests to be compelling, the court then would
determine if there is a less intrusive means of furthering these
interests. Using the guidelines established by the aforementioned
cases, this Section demonstrates why California's statute clearly
fails this second requirement.
Subsection 1 discusses why
California has not used the least restrictive means available to
further its state interests.
Subsection 2 explains why no
substantial connection exists between the California statute and

194. Id. The lower court did not make any findings about the necessity of

this course of action or the availability of reasonable alternatives. Id. at 136.
In fact, the lower court did not acknowledge the defendant's liberty interest in
freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs at all. Id.
195. 494 U.S. 210, 217 (1990). The defendant argued that involuntary
medication was impermissible unless he was adjudicated incompetent. Id. at

222.
196. Id. at 221-22.
197. Id. at 222.
198. Id. at 222-23, 243.
199. Id. at 236. Under the provisions of the state law, a psychiatrist had to
determine that the inmate was mentally ill and dangerous and that the
medication was appropriate. Id. at 215. This decision then had to be reviewed

by a committee of independent medical decision makers. Id. at 215-16. The
regulation also provided for notice, the right to be present at an advisory
hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 216.
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the compelling state interests.
1.

California'sStatute is Overbroad

The Riggins and Harper Courts recognized that the forcible
injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body
represents a material interference with that person's privacy. °°
"The invasion is particularly intrusive if it creates a substantial

risk of permanent injury.

...

,201

The action is especially debasing

when it usurps a competent person's choice to refuse medical
treatment. °2 When the design of the forced medication is "to alter
the will and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of
liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense." 22 Thus, a sex
offender's interest in avoiding the administration of chemically
altering drugs originates in our Nation's most fundamental
values.2 4
California's statute impermissibly encroaches upon this
interest. The statute arbitrarily forces chemical castration on
parolees without a medical determination of the drug's potential
effectiveness or of the individual's physical toleration for the
drug. 200 Under the terms of the statute, all twice-convicted sex
offenders must undergo hormonal injections upon parole.2 0'6 The
California legislature imposes this chemical treatment without
any evidence of its effectiveness. First, studies show Depo-Provera
to be effective only for one type of sex offender, paraphiliacs.2 7°
This statute mandates chemical castration for all offenders,
regardless of type.2 0 Second, no study establishes the drug's
effects when administered on an involuntary basis. 20 9 To date,
participation in Depo-Provera treatment programs has been on a
voluntary basis, with researchers choosing participants only after
a finding of amenability to treatment.2"' Third, the drug has only
been
effective
when
combined
with
individualized
psychotherapy.2"' Even then, no large-scale studies exist of the

200. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133-34; Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22.

201. Harper, 494 U.S. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (concluding involuntary medication of an inmate is improper absent a
judicial determination of incompetence).

202. Id.
203. Id. at 237-38.
204. Id. at 238.
205. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997); WOMEN'S COALITION, SENATE
RULES COMM., REPORT ON CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).
206. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997).
207. Turk, supra note 110, at 12; see discussion supra pp. 393-94.
208. Turk, supra note 110, at 12; CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997).
209. Hanna & Kuczka, supra note 105, at 1; Turk, supra note 110, at 12.
210. Lacitis, supra note 5, at Dl; see discussion supra pp. 388-89.
211. Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 9.
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drug's effectiveness on recidivism. 12 Finally, Depo-Provera may
result in dangerous and unknown side effects. 13 The state is
indiscriminately exposing sex offenders to these risks without any
finding that chemical castration is medically appropriate and
For these reasons, the breadth of
potentially effective.214
California's statute impermissibly infringes on substantive due
process guarantees.
California's failure to use the least restrictive means available
to further its state interests violates procedural due process as
well. The statute requires chemical castration for all twiceconvicted child molesters without any finding of amenability to
treatment.2 15 The decision to medicate a parolee against his will is
arbitrary; no procedural safeguards are provided to ensure it is not
erroneous. Under Harper,procedural due process requires at least
a determination of overriding justification and medical
appropriateness before a state can involuntarily medicate an
individual. 6
2. California'sStatute Failsto Address any Compelling State
Interest
The California statute fails strict constitutional scrutiny on a
second ground as well. The statute seeks to further the state
interests of protecting the public, reducing crime and
reassimilating the parolee into the community. 217 However, even
assuming these interests are compelling, the statute fails to
address all three interests. Depo-Provera can be effective only in
the treatment of paraphiliacs, yet the statute fails to distinguish
among the various classes of sex offenders. 18 As a result, the
The
recidivism of non-paraphiliacs remains unaffected.
mandatory parole condition deprives offenders of alternative
treatments that might prove more effective in reassimilating them
into society. More significantly, the public works under the false
assumption that these chemically castrated offenders are no
The release of a sex offender into the
longer dangerous.
community without effective treatment jeopardizes public safety.
The release of a sex offender under the false pretense that he is
cured fosters a false sense of public security, thereby increasing
212. Id.
213. Id.; Laws of Impotence, supra note 32, at 18.
214. WOMEN'S

COALITION,

SENATE

RULES

COMM.,

REPORT

ON

CAL.

ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996); Castration or Incarceration?,
supra note 126, at 3.
215. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997); see discussion supra pp. 396-99.

216. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35 (reviewing the Court's holding in
Harper).
217. See discussion supra pp. 403-04.
218. Turk, supra note 110, at 12; WOMEN'S COALITION, SENATE RULES
COMM., REPORT ON CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).
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public risk.
Even among paraphiliac sex offenders, the statute fails.
Studies showing the drug reduces recidivism have been shortterm,
voluntary
and
accompanied
by
individualized
psychotherapy. 19 California's statute takes none of these findings
into account. The statute imposes Depo-Provera treatment on an
involuntary basis; however, not one study exists showing the
effectiveness of chemical castration when administered without
therapy and on an unwilling individual.22 ° The forcible injection of
medication into a nonconsenting person's body is highly invasive. 221
The right to control one's own mind and body is sacred.222 No right
is more valued than the right to be let alone from the government
interfering in zones of personal privacy.2 1
California's
indiscriminate infringement upon this fundamental right is
impermissible and unconstitutional.224
IV. TAILORING THE STATUTE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL FIT

Although a solution is needed for the high rate of recidivism
among sex offenders, California's statute as written does not
provide a constitutionally permissible answer. The public has
increased its pressure on state legislatures to address the growing

219. See discussion supra pp. 386-87 and supra notes 75-80.
220. Castrationor Incarceration?,supra note 126, at 3.
221. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237-38 (1990).
222. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
223. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
224. California's statute also may violate the Equal Protection Clause. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not deny the state, "the power to treat different
classes of persons in different ways." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447
(1972). Instead, the Equal Protection Clause denies the state the power to
"legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute
into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective
of that statute." Id. A court applies the same strict scrutiny test used in due
process analysis-the different treatment must be both necessary and the
least restrictive means available to achieve a compelling state interest. Id.
Under the statute, California denies parole to a sex offender who refuses the
forced medical injections of Depo-Provera. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West
1997). Even assuming California's interests in protecting the public and
reintegrating the parolee into society are compelling, the denial of parole is
not necessary to further those interests. Studies indicate that Depo-Provera is
effective for only one type of sex offender. California does not further a
compelling state interest by forcing a sex offender to comply with ineffective
medical treatment. Conversely, an offender who refuses ineffective treatment
does not impede a state interest. The public will receive the same level of
protection and the parolee will receive the same level of rehabilitative
assistance whether the offender refuses or accepts the injections. Ineffective
treatment is the equivalent of no treatment at all. The imposition of DepoProvera is arbitrary, has no relation to the purpose of the statute and is not
the least restrictive means available to achieve a compelling state interest.
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problem of sexual abuse in our nation.2 5 Encouraged by studies
indicating that Depo-Provera could be effective in treating
paraphiliac sex offenders, California responded to this pressure
and enacted its chemical castration statute.2 6 Proponents of the
bill argue this treatment is necessary to protect the public and
solve the problem of recidivist sex offenders. 2 7 Even if these state
interests are compelling, California's indiscriminate
and
involuntary requirement of chemical castration for paroled
offenders is unconstitutionally broad.
California and other states do not have to abandon DepoProvera programs altogether. Chemical castration can be a useful
rehabilitative tool.2 2
To impose this treatment in sentencing,
however, state regulation must meet three requirements. First,
each candidate must undergo a medical evaluation to determine if
that offender is amenable to treatment. Additionally, a physician
should screen the candidate for pre-existing medical conditions
that might result in dangerous side effects. Second, the hormonal
treatment should be only one component of a comprehensive
psychological treatment program. Third, the offender should
voluntarily consent to the treatment after being informed of any
material risks.
Under these limited conditions, chemical
castration could prove an effective rehabilitation device and
recidivism solution.
Therefore, this Comment proposes that
California amend its chemical castration statute. Upon its failure
to do so, the courts should strike the statute down as
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Sexual abuse is "a heinous crime" that "must be stopped," but
California's statute falls short of addressing that need. 229 No study
shows that Depo-Provera, administered alone, treats any type of
sex offender. Instead, studies show that Depo-Provera makes one
type of sex offender, paraphiliacs, more amenable to treatment.
California's statute neither requires a medical determination of
whether the sex offender is a paraphiliac, nor requires any broader
psychological treatment plan. As written, California's statute will
not prevent any type of sex offender from engaging in criminal
sexual behavior.
A sex offender's right to refuse medical treatment is a
225. See discussion supra pp. 382-83 and notes 17-22 and accompanying
text.
226. WOMEN'S COALITION, SENATE RULES COMM.,
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 3339, Reg. Sess. (1996).

REPORT

ON

CAL.

227. Will Chemical CastrationStop Sex Offenders?, supra note 98, at 16; see

discussion supra pp. 395-97.
228. See discussion suprapp. 388-89.
229. Will Chemical CastrationStop Sex Offenders?, supra note 98, at 16.
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fundamental privacy right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. A state cannot infringe upon this right unless its
regulation is the least intrusive means available to further a
compelling state interest. Forcible injection into a nonconsenting
person's body represents a material interference with that person's
privacy and constitutes a fundamental deprivation of liberty.
California's decision to forcibly medicate a parolee is purely
arbitrary. The state is indiscriminately exposing sex offenders to
dangerous side effects without any finding that Depo-Provera is
medically appropriate.
Sex crimes involving children are a growing problem in
America and call for legislative action.
However, California
proposes an ineffective solution at the expense of an individual's
constitutional rights. No right is more sacred than the right to
control one's own mind and body free from governmental
interference. California's statute impermissibly infringes upon
this right by mandating forced hormonal injections for paroled sex
offenders without regard for its effectiveness. The statute fails to
pass strict constitutional scrutiny and the courts should strike it
down.

